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Roman Imperium, Greek Paideia: 
Plutarch’s Lives of Aemilius Paullus and 
Timoleon
Douglas Cairns
This paper focuses on the theme of fortune (tychē) and its mutability in Plutarch’s 
Parallel Lives of Aemilius Paullus and Timoleon, first at the level of individual 
biography and then as it applies to the progress of civilization and the rise and fall 
of great powers. The Greek Life (of Timoleon) makes greatest explicit use of the 
notion of historical destiny, yet in such a way as to provide a yardstick by which 
to bring out what is latent in its Roman counterpart, while the much more explicit 
deployment of traditional Greek cultural models at the individual level in the Aemilius 
also helps shape the interpretation of the Timoleon. Paradoxically, perhaps, it is the 
Roman Life that highlights, in thoroughly Greek terms, the vicissitudes of a single 
life, a central focus of traditional Greek thought on the nature and possibility of 
happiness, whereas the Greek Life exemplifies the notion of historical destiny that 
is so important for Rome and the Romans. The theme of vicissitude (what I call “the 
principle of alternation,” i.e., the notion that no human life is free of misfortune and 
that the best one can hope for is a mixture of good and bad) interacts with that of 
historical destiny and informs both Lives in this pair. Reading each Life in the light of 
the other and both together as single artistic project offers insights that are lost if 
we treat each in isolation; this highlights, in particular, Plutarch’s perspective on the 
enduring value of Greek culture under the military and political supremacy of the 
Romans.
The pair of Lives of Aemilius and Timoleon (in which the Roman, 
unusually, is the first) opens with one of Plutarch’s strongest statements of 
the exemplary purpose of biography (Aem. 1. 1, 1. 5):1 
1 Cf. Russell 1973, 100; Desideri 1989, 199–204, 212–15; Desideri 1992, 4473–75; Duff 
1999, 34–36, 50, 53–54; Lamberton 2001, 72–74; Zadorojnyi 2010, 169–73, esp. on the 
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ἐμοὶ τῆς τῶν βίων ἅψασθαι μὲν γραφῆς συνέβη δι’ ἑτέρους, ἐπιμένειν δὲ καὶ 
φιλοχωρεῖν ἤδη καὶ δι’ ἐμαυτόν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πειρώμενον ἁμῶς 
γέ πως κοσμεῖν καὶ ἀφομοιοῦν πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων ἀρετὰς τὸν βίον. . . .
ἡμεῖς δὲ τῇ περὶ τὴν ἱστορίαν διατριβῇ καὶ τῆς γραφῆς τῇ συνηθείᾳ 
παρασκευάζομεν ἑαυτούς, τὰς τῶν ἀρίστων καὶ δοκιμωτάτων μνήμας 
ὑποδεχομένους ἀεὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς, εἴ τι φαῦλον ἢ κακόηθες ἢ ἀγεννὲς αἱ τῶν 
συνόντων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὁμιλίαι προσβάλλουσιν, ἐκκρούειν καὶ διωθεῖσθαι, πρὸς τὰ 
κάλλιστα τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἵλεω καὶ πρᾳεῖαν ἀποστρέφοντες τὴν διάνοιαν.
I find that, though I commenced the writing of my Lives for the benefit of 
others, I now persist and return with pleasure to the task for my own sake, 
too, attempting, as though in a mirror, to arrange my life and assimilate it to 
the virtues of my subjects by telling their stories. . . . In my own case, since 
my mind is always welcoming toward the remembrance of the best and 
most esteemed individuals, I am equipped by the study of history and the 
familiarity therewith that my writing produces to shun and reject anything 
base, malicious, or ignoble that enforced association with others may press 
upon me, diverting my thoughts calmly and dispassionately toward the 
fairest paradeigmata there are. 
The introduction similarly emphasizes the role of good fortune (agathai 
tychai, eupotmia) in the success of each of the pair’s subjects (Aem. 1. 6):2
ὧν ἐν τῷ παρόντι προκεχειρίσμεθά σοι τὸν Τιμολέοντος τοῦ Κορινθίου καὶ 
Αἰμιλίου Παύλου βίον, ἀνδρῶν οὐ μόνον ταῖς αἱρέσεσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς τύχαις 
ἀγαθαῖς ὁμοίως κεχρημένων ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα, καὶ διαμφισβήτησιν παρεξόντων, 
πότερον εὐποτμίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ φρονήσει τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πεπραγμένων κατώρθωσαν.
Among these are the Lives I have chosen for you now, of Timoleon the 
Corinthian and Aemilius Paullus, men who were alike not only in their 
principles but also in the good fortune that their careers manifested, making 
it a matter of debate whether their greatest successes were due to luck or to 
judgment.
mirror motif. 
2 On Plut.’s views on tychē, in philosophical and nonphilosophical works, see Swain 
1989b, esp. 274–75: “In more serious thinking Plutarch has no time for τύχη but he does 
believe in δαίμονες.” Thus the usage of the Lives simply reflects contemporary idiom; cf. 
Tatum 2010a: 449. On eupotmia in Aem. 1. 6, cf. Swain 1989b, 300.
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We shall return below to issues of parallelism and comparison, with 
particular reference to the role of fortune and its mutability in the lives 
of Aemilius and Timoleon and in the structure of the narratives which 
recount their careers. It is clear, however, that Plutarch did not invent 
the association between the subjects of this pair of biographies and tychē 
(fortune)—certainly not in the case of Aemilius,3 and very probably not 
in that of Timoleon, either. The role of tychē, for good or for ill, in the life 
and career of Aemilius and Aemilius’ own circumspection with respect to 
tychē’s role in human affairs are clearly present in Polybius’ fragmentary 
narrative of the Third Macedonian War,4 reflected in the adaptations of 
that account by Diodorus and Livy, and virtually proverbial by the time of 
Plutarch.5 Similarly, Plutarch may also have found an emphasis on tychē 
in Timaeus’ account of Timoleon’s campaigns in Sicily: Timaeus is cited 
at Timoleon 36. 2 for his use of a quotation from Sophocles in presenting 
Timoleon as a recipient of divine favor.6 But though the centrality of tychē 
to these two Lives is not a Plutarchan invention, it is instructive to explore 
the subtlety and artistry with which Plutarch has taken this theme and 
turned it into the Leitmotiv that structures each of the two narratives and 
guides the reader’s appreciation of the relations between them.7 
L. Aemilius Paullus had a long and distinguished career, but Plutarch’s 
Life concentrates on a single campaign (his victory over Perseus of 
3 Cf. Swain 1989c, 323: “Aemilius’ association with fortune was one which Plutarch 
found in his sources.” Cf. Geiger 1981, 103.
4 See Walbank 1957–79, iii. 378; Geiger 1981, 102–3; Swain 1989c, 317, 324–27; Tatum 
2010a, 453–58.
5 With Aem. 24. 4–6, cf. Cic. Nat. D. 2. 6, Val. Max. 1. 8. 1, Pliny, HN 7. 86, Florus 1. 28. 
14–15. With Aem. 27. 2–5, cf. Plb. 29. 20 (with Walbank 1957–79, iii. 392; Hau 2007, 
141), Livy 45. 8. 6–7, D. S. 30. 23. 1–2, Florus 1. 28. 11. With Aem. 28. 4, cf. Plb. 30. 10, 
Livy 45. 27. 7. With Aem. 34. 8–38. 1, cf. Cic. ad Fam. 4. 6. 1, Tusc. 3. 70, Livy 45. 41, D. 
S. 31. 11, Vell. 1. 10. 3–5, Val. Max. 5. 10. 2, App. Mac. 19. Cf. also Plb. 29. 21 (Perseus’ 
downfall prompts citation of Demetrius of Phalerum on mutability; cf. D. S. 31. 10, 
perhaps also Livy 45. 9. 2–7, with Walbank 1957–79, iii. 393); D. S. 31. 9. 4 (Aemilius 
once more—cf. 30. 23. 1–2—sees Perseus as an example of the mutability of fortune 
and the need for humility in triumph); Livy 44. 40. 3–10 (fortuna initiates the battle of 
Pydna; contrast Aem. 18. 1–3); Pliny, HN 34. 54 (Aemilius dedicates a Phidian statue of 
Athena in the temple of Fortuna Huiusce Diei).
6 See Fontana 1958, esp. 7–11; Geiger 1981, 101–3; Swain 1989c, 327; cf. Swain 1989b, 
284 n. 42; Tatum 2010a, 452. On the “Herodotean” character of Timaeus’ history, see 
now Baron 2012.
7 Cf. Geiger 1981, 103–4; Swain 1989c, 314, 327–29; Tatum 2010a, 449–50.
8    HORIZONS, vol. 5, no. 1 (2014)
Macedonia, during his second consulship, at the age of around sixty, in 
168 BCE). The introduction to this episode begins in chapter 8; the decisive 
battle occupies chapters 15–21; Aemilius’ triumph and the events that 
surround it are narrated in chapters 30–36; the narrative of the war is 
concluded in chapter 37; and the work ends in 39. Its climax is clearly the 
(three-day) triumph held in September 167, the height of Aemilius’ success. 
The triumph itself is narrated as a climactic tricolon:8 its first day occupies 
chapter 32. 4; the second, chapter 32. 5–9; and the third, chapters 33–34. 
The climactic triumph, however, is postponed by a dramatic moment 
of crisis—the envy of Aemilius’ inferiors, masked as indignation,9 together 
with the political opportunism of his enemies, threatens the triumph, until 
(as in the epinician poetry of Pindar and Bacchylides) generous recognition 
of genuine merit and achievement prevail (30. 4–32. 1). In the midst of 
the victory celebrations, all eyes are on Aemilius, and he is admired by all 
good men (34. 7):
ἐδαφνηφόρει δὲ καὶ σύμπας ὁ στρατός, τῷ μὲν ἅρματι τοῦ στρατηγοῦ κατὰ 
λόχους καὶ τάξεις ἑπόμενος, ᾄδων δὲ τὰ μὲν ᾠδάς τινας πατρίους ἀναμεμειγμένας 
γέλωτι, τὰ δὲ παιᾶνας ἐπινικίους καὶ τῶν διαπεπραγμένων ἐπαίνους εἰς τὸν 
Αἰμίλιον, περίβλεπτον ὄντα καὶ ζηλωτὸν ὑπὸ πάντων, οὐδενὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν 
ἐπίφθονον. . . .
The whole army also carried laurel, following the chariot of their general 
by companies and divisions, and singing, partly certain traditional songs 
with a comic element, as the ancient custom was, and partly victory paeans 
and encomia addressed to Aemilius, the object of everyone’s attention and 
admiration, begrudged by no one that was good.
But Aemilius’ success is immediately undercut by adversity: no decent 
human being wishes him ill, but there is some force that sees to it that no 
prosperity is unmixed with evil (34. 8):10 
8 Cf. Swain 1989c, 325.
9 For the issues here, see Cairns 2003 (with further lit.).
10 Plut. certainly seems to believe in the phenomenon to which this passage refers, but 
his subsequent references to Tyche and her nemesis (cf. below) present it in a traditional 
idiom to whose implications he presumably does not subscribe (Swain 1989b, 300). 
At Mar. 23. 1 the force which leaves no great success akratos (unmixed) and katharos 
(pure) is indifferently “tychē, nemesis, or the necessary nature of affairs” (ἡ δὲ μηθὲν ἐῶσα 
τῶν μεγάλων εὐτυχημάτων ἄκρατον εἰς ἡδονὴν καὶ καθαρόν, ἀλλὰ μείξει κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν 
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πλὴν εἴ τι δαιμόνιον ἄρα τῶν μεγάλων καὶ ὑπερόγκων εἴληχεν εὐτυχιῶν 
ἀπαρύτειν καὶ μειγνύναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον, ὅπως μηδενὶ κακῶν ἄκρατος εἴη 
καὶ καθαρός. . . .
Unless it is true that some divine force has been allotted the task of 
detracting from exceedingly great good fortune and of making a mixture of 
human existence, in order that no one’s life should be unsullied or without 
admixture of trouble. . . .
Two of Aemilius’ sons (aged 14 and 12) died, one five days before the 
triumph and the other three days after it. The Roman people see this as an 
illustration of the mutability of fortune (35. 3):
ὥστε μηδένα γενέσθαι Ῥωμαίων τοῦ πάθους ἀνάλγητον, ἀλλὰ φρῖξαι τὴν 
ὠμότητα τῆς τύχης ἅπαντας, ὡς οὐκ ᾐδέσατο πένθος τοσοῦτον εἰς οἰκίαν ζήλου 
καὶ χαρᾶς καὶ θυσιῶν γέμουσαν εἰσάγουσα, καὶ καταμειγνύουσα θρήνους καὶ 
δάκρυα παιᾶσιν ἐπινικίοις καὶ θριάμβοις.
The result was that there was no Roman unaffected by his suffering; rather, 
they all shuddered at the cruelty of Fortune, as she felt no compunction at 
bringing such great grief into a house that was full of admiration, joy, and 
sacrifices, or at mixing up laments and tears with paeans of victory and 
triumphs.11
Aemilius agrees, and gives a speech in which he reflects that, in this case, 
this universal rule applies only to his own fortunes rather that to those of 
the Roman state (36. 3–9). This speech is the longest of three that Aemilius 
makes on the same subject, and it contains several themes that occur in 
earlier passages of the Life and play a significant role in the structure of the 
narrative. First, Aemilius notes that, although his campaign against Perseus 
had been attended by good fortune from start to finish, he himself had 
ποικίλλουσα τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον, ἢ τύχη τις ἢ νέμεσις ἢ πραγμάτων ἀναγκαία φύσις). On 
nemesis’ shift from “righteous indignation” in Homer to something more like phthonos 
(malice, begrudgery) in later authors, see Konstan 2003.
11 Cf. the reversal (within single hour) in the fortunes of the cities and people of Epirus, 
with the result that “all men shuddered at the outcome of the war, that a whole nation 
could be chopped up and shared out with so little profit or gain for each individual” 
(φρῖξαι δὲ πάντας ἀνθρώπους τὸ τοῦ πολέμου τέλος, εἰς μικρὸν οὕτω τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον λῆμμα καὶ 
κέρδος ἔθνους ὅλου κατακερματισθέντος, 29. 5). On this passage, cf. below, with Pelling 
2005a, 209. 
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never taken this for granted, but had always been afraid of some reversal 
(36. 3, 5–6): 
ἔφη γάρ, ὅτι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων οὐδὲν οὐδέποτε δείσας, τῶν δὲ θείων ὡς 
ἀπιστότατον καὶ ποικιλώτατον πρᾶγμα τὴν Τύχην ἀεὶ φοβηθείς, μάλιστα περὶ 
τοῦτον αὐτῆς τὸν πόλεμον ὥσπερ πνεύματος λαμπροῦ ταῖς πράξεσι παρούσης, 
διατελοίη μεταβολήν τινα καὶ παλίρροιαν προσδεχόμενος.
“ἀπιστῶν δὲ τῇ Τύχῃ διὰ τὴν εὔροιαν τῶν πραγμάτων, ὡς ἄδεια πολλὴ καὶ 
κίνδυνος οὐδεὶς ἦν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, μάλιστα κατὰ πλοῦν ἐδεδίειν τὴν 
μεταβολὴν τοῦ δαίμονος ἐπ’ εὐτυχίᾳ <τοσαύτῃ>, τοσοῦτον στρατὸν νενικηκότα 
καὶ λάφυρα καὶ βασιλεῖς αἰχμαλώτους κομίζων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ σωθεὶς πρὸς 
ὑμᾶς, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὁρῶν εὐφροσύνης καὶ ζήλου καὶ θυσιῶν γέμουσαν, ἔτι τὴν 
Τύχην δι’ ὑποψίας εἶχον, εἰδὼς οὐδὲν εἰλικρινὲς οὐδ’ ἀνεμέσητον ἀνθρώποις τῶν 
μεγάλων χαριζομένην.”
He said that he had never been afraid of any human power, but among 
divine powers he had always feared Fortune, regarding her as a most 
untrustworthy and variable thing; and since in this war in particular she 
had been present in his actions like a favorable wind, he had never ceased 
to expect some change or reversal.
 
“Since I distrusted Tyche because things were going so well, now that there 
was nothing to fear and no danger from the enemy, during my voyage 
home, in particular, I feared the daimōn’s change after such good fortune, 
since I was bringing home a victorious army of such size, with spoils and 
royal prisoners. Indeed, even when I had got safely back to you, and saw the 
city full of festive joy and admiration and sacrifices, I was still suspicious of 
Tyche, because I knew that she grants human beings no great favor that is 
straightforward or free of nemesis.”
Second, he draws the conclusion that the vanquished Perseus and the 
victorious Aemilius are both equally good paradeigmata of human 
vulnerability (36. 9): 
“ἱκανῶς γὰρ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς κακοῖς εἰς τὴν τῶν κατωρθωμένων ἀποκέχρηται 
νέμεσιν, οὐκ ἀφανέστερον ἔχουσα παράδειγμα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἀσθενείας τοῦ 
θριαμβευομένου τὸν θριαμβεύοντα· πλὴν ὅτι Περσεὺς μὲν ἔχει καὶ νενικημένος 
τοὺς παῖδας, Αἰμίλιος δὲ τοὺς αὑτοῦ νικήσας ἀπέβαλεν.”
“For she [sc. Tyche] has made sufficient use of me and my afflictions to 
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satisfy her nemesis at our successes,12 since she has as clear an example of 
human frailty in the hero of the triumph as in its victim; except that Perseus, 
even though defeated, keeps his children, while Aemilius, the victor, has lost 
his.” 
Both these points punctuate the work as it builds toward its climax: there 
are repeated references to Aemilius’ exceptional good fortune (or divine 
protection);13 portents presage Aemilius’ success and Perseus’ defeat;14 and 
the contrast between the noble Aemilius and the avaricious, cowardly, 
and possibly base-born Perseus, especially in their reactions to good or 
ill fortune, recurs.15 Whereas Perseus’ faults and misjudgments contribute 
to Aemilius’ luck and Perseus’ own downfall, Aemilius himself is careful 
throughout to avoid tempting fate, remaining cautious when things go 
well and constantly reminding others, especially the less experienced, of 
the dangers of becoming carried away by success.16 These dangers are 
exemplified by his own son, Scipio Aemilianus (22. 2–9): Aemilius fears 
that the seventeen-year-old Scipio has become elated by victory and 
perished, but he lives to become the destroyer of Carthage and Numantia, 
while Tyche merely defers the effects of her nemesis at Aemilius’ success 
until another day (22. 9): 
Αἰμιλίῳ μὲν οὖν τὴν τοῦ κατορθώματος νέμεσιν εἰς ἕτερον ἡ Τύχη καιρὸν 
ὑπερβαλλομένη, τότε παντελῆ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀπεδίδου τῆς νίκης.
So Tyche deferred her nemesis at Aemilius’ success for another occasion, and 
for the moment gave him back in its entirety his pleasure in his victory.
This is not just the general idea that good fortune is inherently unstable 
12 For the thought that one’s sufferings to date should be enough to satisfy divine 
resentment, cf. Nicias at Thuc. 7. 77. 3. Nicias speaks of phthonos, but Aemilius of 
nemesis; cf. note 10 above.
13 12. 1, 19. 6, 24. 2–6.
14 10. 6–8, 17. 7–11, 24. 4–6.
15 12. 3–6, 12. 12, 19. 4–6, 23. 1–24. 1, 26. 4–12, 27. 4–5, 33. 6–8, 37. 2. For Perseus as 
a foil, cf. Swain 1989c: 325 (cf. 321–22 on Hicetas as foil for Timoleon in Tim.). On the 
presentation of Perseus, see further Scuderi 2004/5.
16 17. 3–4, 17. 10–13, 27. 1–6.
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and that vicissitude is inevitable,17 an idea that might, given its prominence 
in archaic poetry, Attic tragedy, and historiography, simply be regarded as 
the common currency of Greek popular thought,18 for in this case there is a 
specific model: the climax of the Life’s narrative, the reversal which occurs 
at the height of Aemilius’ success, is introduced as follows (34. 8): ὅπως 
μηδενὶ κακῶν ἄκρατος εἴη καὶ καθαρός, ἀλλὰ καθ’ Ὅμηρον ἄριστα δοκῶσι 
πράττειν, οἷς αἱ τύχαι ῥοπὴν ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα τῶν πραγμάτων ἔχουσιν (“in order 
that no one’s life should be unsullied or without admixture of trouble, but 
that, as Homer says, those may be regarded as best off whose fortunes shift 
in the balance, now this way, now that”).19 This is a direct allusion to a 
seminal passage of Homer’s Iliad (24. 525–35):
“ὡς γὰρ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσι
ζώειν ἀχνυμένοις· αὐτοὶ δέ τ’ ἀκηδέες εἰσί.
δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει
δώρων οἷα δίδωσι κακῶν, ἕτερος δὲ ἑάων·
ᾧ μέν κ’ ἀμμίξας δώῃ Ζεὺς τερπικέραυνος,
ἄλλοτε μέν τε κακῷ ὅ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δ’ ἐσθλῷ·
ᾧ δέ κε τῶν λυγρῶν δώῃ, λωβητὸν ἔθηκε,
καί ἑ κακὴ βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα δῖαν ἐλαύνει,
φοιτᾷ δ’ οὔτε θεοῖσι τετιμένος οὔτε βροτοῖσιν.
ὣς μὲν καὶ Πηλῆϊ θεοὶ δόσαν ἀγλαὰ δῶρα
ἐκ γενετῆς” (κτλ.)
17 On the mutability of fortune in the Lives in general, see Russell 1973, 115; Duff 1999, 
41–42; Pelling 1986, 93–95 (= Pelling 2002, 356–58).
18 On the prominence of the theme in these genres, from Homer to the fifth century, see 
Krause 1976. On (esp. fourth century and Hellenistic) historiography, see Hau 2007; 
cf. Hau 2009 (on Diodorus) and Hau 2011 (on Polybius). On the continuity between 
Plutarch’s Lives and his predecessors among the historians in their use of what one might 
regard as “tragic” themes, cf. Pelling 2002, esp. 97–98, 106, 111 n. 27; cf. 117–41 (esp. 
120–21, 130–31); cf. Pelling 2005a, 280–83. And on Homeric and tragic patterns in the 
Lives in general, see Mossman 1988; Zadorojniy 1997; D’Ippolito, 2004. 
19 Plut. cites or alludes to the passage also at Aud. poet. 20E (Il. 24. 525–26), 22B (24. 
525–26), 24A (24. 527–28); Cons. Apoll. 105C–D (24. 522–33); Is. et Os. 369C (24. 
527–28); Tranq. an. 473B (24. 527–28); Exil. 600C (24. 527–28). Cf. the quotation of Il. 
24. 560–61, 569–70, and 584–86 at Aud. poet. 31A–C. The versions of 24. 527–28 used 
in 24B and 600D are influenced by the variant cited by Plato at Resp. 379d (Díaz Lavado 
2010, 277; Hunter and Russell 2011, 135). On Plut.’s use of the parable in the Moralia, 
see D’Ippolito 2004, 28–30; Díaz Lavado 2010, 276–80. On his use of Homer in general 
in the Moralia, see Bréchet 2004/5; D’Ippolito 2004 (cf. D’Ippolito 2007); Díaz Lavado 
2010. 
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“For thus have the gods spun the thread for wretched mortals, that they 
should live in pain; but they themselves are without care. For there are 
two jars placed on the floor of Zeus of gifts that he gives, the one of ills, 
the other of blessings. If Zeus who delights in the thunderbolt gives a man 
a mixed lot, that man meets now with evil, now with good; but if he gives 
only from the evils, he ruins a man, and evil hunger drives him over the 
divine earth, and he wanders honored by neither gods nor mortals. Just so 
the gods gave splendid gifts to Peleus from birth. . . .”
This is a fundamental formulation of a characteristic Greek attitude 
toward the nature and possibility of happiness. It represents a distinctive 
worldview, one that rests on the gulf between human and god and 
emphasizes the place of human beings in a universe that cannot be bent 
to their will and that imposes limits on human aspiration. The image of 
the jars specifies conditions that apply to all, but these general conditions 
are emphasized by paradigmatic application. Priam wants to stress the 
similarity but also the difference between himself and Peleus; Achilles uses 
his knowledge of his own fate to restate the similarity and present his own 
father as an exemplum; he uses the further exemplum of Niobe, a paradigm 
of suffering (599–620), to underline the central point that others suffer 
as we do, yet persevere, as we must. This is a moral that has validity not 
just for the immediate context in Iliad 24, but for the entire Iliad. What 
Achilles tells Priam, using the exempla of Peleus, Niobe, and Priam himself, 
is simultaneously what the stories of both Priam and Achilles tell us. The 
exemplary force of the narrative is highlighted by the use of the exemplary 
mode in the narrative. The Iliad employs this mode at some of its most 
crucial junctures; such passages underline the exemplary force of the poem 
itself.20 
Achilles’ consolation of Priam and the pity he feels for Priam focus 
on the same fact—that suffering is common to all; Achilles sees his own 
father in Priam, and Priam, in turn, is encouraged to recognize that his 
fate is not unique. The particular circumstances in which these conclusions 
are drawn (in which a man returns his worst enemy’s body for burial), 
the emotional power of the episode, the narrative salience of the context, 
and the exemplary force both of the passage itself and of the poem that 
20 See, above all, Howie (1995) 2012. For a definition of exemplarity, as part of a 
splendid account of its importance in Roman culture, see Roller 2004.
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this passage brings to a close all contribute to the inestimable significance 
of this ethical and narrative model in Greek literary and intellectual 
culture. George Steiner was only mildly exaggerating when he wrote that 
“The more one experiences ancient Greek literature and civilization, the 
more insistent the suggestion that Hellas is rooted in the twenty-fourth 
Book of the Iliad.”21 I have discussed elsewhere the Greek tradition’s later 
manifestations of this Iliadic motif.22 Here, one salient example shall suffice. 
The principle of alternation not only is the traditional basis that underlies 
Aristotle’s emphasis on profound changes in fortune in the Poetics, but also 
informs his opening discussion of the nature of eudaimonia (happiness) 
in the first Book of the Ethics, where his preference for the classic plot 
type discussed in the Poetics is matched by the serious consideration that 
he gives its archaic ethical underpinnings.23 It is true, at least in a sense, 
that one should count no man happy until he is dead;24 eudaimonia is a 
quality of a whole life, and lives as wholes are vulnerable to the kinds of 
vicissitude that feature in the representations of the downfall of exemplary 
figures from the heroic past in epic and tragedy. In conceding something 
to traditional wisdom, Aristotle tellingly makes his point by means of a 
traditional exemplum—that of Priam (EN 1100a4–9, 1101a6–13).
Plutarch is thus following a long and culturally salient Greek tradition. 
But his reference to Homer by name is not the only indication of his debt to 
Iliad 24. We are alerted to the relevance of Achilles’ encounter with Priam 
in the very first chapter of Aemilius-Timoleon, when Plutarch, presenting his 
research on his biographical subjects as a kind of personal acquaintance, 
quotes Il. 24. 630 (Priam admires Achilles’ “stature and appearance,” ὅσσος 
ἔην οἷός τε). The influence goes further: the captured Perseus supplicates 
(26. 9), as does Priam, and Aemilius accepts his supplication, and not 
only the acceptance but also the language in which it is described recall 
the Iliadic scene: with Aem. 27. 1 (τοῦτον μὲν ἀναστήσας καὶ δεξιωσάμενος 
Τουβέρωνι παρέδωκεν, “he raised Perseus up, gave him his hand, and 
entrusted him to Tubero”) we should compare Il. 24. 515–16 (γέροντα δὲ 
21 Steiner 1984, 242. Cf. Krause 1976, 50 on Il. 24. 525ff. as the “Vergleichsbasis für alle 
späteren Entwicklungen” (of the principle of alternation).
22 See Cairns 2014; cf. Cairns 2006; 2011.
23 See esp. EN 1100a4–11, 1101a6–13.
24 As in Sim. 521 PMG = 244 Poltera; A. Ag. 928–29; E. Andr. 100–102, Hcld. 865–66, 
Tro. 509–10; Hdt. 1.32.7.
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χειρὸς ἀνίστη οἰκτίρων πολιόν τε κάρη πολιόν τε γένειον, “he raised the old 
man by his hand, pitying his hoary head and hoary beard”). The difference 
is that, whereas Achilles pities his enemy (a feature of the Iliad passage 
whose cultural significance can scarcely be overestimated),25 Aemilius is 
deprived of the opportunity to pity Perseus by the latter’s ignoble behavior: 
he at first takes Perseus to be “a great man brought low by the anger of 
the gods and the hostility of fortune” (ὡς ἀνδρὶ μεγάλῳ πεπτωκότι πτῶμα 
νεμεσητὸν καὶ δυστυχές) and comes to meet him with tears in his eyes 
(ἐξαναστὰς προϋπήντα μετὰ τῶν φίλων δεδακρυμένος, 26. 8), but Perseus’ 
abject behavior leads him to believe that it is the latter’s prosperity, not 
his misfortune, that is undeserved (26. 10). Defeat of such an unworthy 
opponent detracts from Aemilius’ success (26. 11), and Perseus is devoid 
of the aretē (excellence) that attracts aidōs (respect),26 even for a defeated 
enemy (26. 12): 
“τί τῆς τύχης” εἶπεν “ὦ ταλαίπωρε τὸ μέγιστον ἀφαιρεῖς τῶν ἐγκλημάτων, ταῦτα 
πράττων ἀφ’ ὧν δόξεις οὐ παρ’ ἀξίαν ἀτυχεῖν, οὐδὲ τοῦ νῦν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πάλαι 
δαίμονος ἀνάξιος γεγονέναι; τί δέ μου καταβάλλεις τὴν νίκην καὶ τὸ κατόρθωμα 
ποιεῖς μικρόν, ἐπιδεικνύμενος ἑαυτὸν οὐ γενναῖον οὐδὲ πρέποντα Ῥωμαίοις 
ἀνταγωνιστήν; ἀρετή τοι δυστυχοῦσι μεγάλην ἔχει μοῖραν αἰδοῦς καὶ παρὰ 
πολεμίοις, δειλία δὲ Ῥωμαίοις κἂν εὐποτμῇ πάντων ἀτιμότατον.”
“You wretch,” he said, “Why do you free tychē from the strongest charge 
you could make, by behaving in ways that will make people think that 
you deserve your misfortunes, and that it is not your present lot but your 
previous one that was undeserved? And why do you undermine my victory 
and diminish my success, by showing that you are not a noble or even a 
fitting antagonist for Romans? Aretē in the unfortunate brings great aidōs 
even in the eyes of their enemies, but, for Romans, cowardice, even if it 
prospers, is the most dishonorable thing of all.” 
Plut. Aem. 26. 10–12
25 Cf. esp. S. Aj. 121–26. The notion that an enemy’s defeat underlines the mutability 
to which all are subject, and should therefore appeal to the humanity of the victor, is 
common in the Hellenistic and later historiography on which Plutarch draws. See esp. 
Plb. 29. 20–21, on Aemilius and Perseus, and cf. Plb. 15. 17. 4, 38. 21; D. S. 13. 20–27, 
28–32, 17. 38. 4–7, 27. 6. 1, 31. 3. 1–3 (with Hau 2007, 37–43, 139, 141).
26 Another feature of the source context in Homer: see Il. 24. 503.
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Clearly, then, the presentation of the theme of the mutability of fortune in 
the Aemilius draws explicitly on the classic articulation and presentation 
of that theme in the Iliad. As in the Iliad, the principle of alternation 
not only structures the narrative but is also voiced authoritatively at an 
important point in that narrative. Also as in the Iliad, the ethical and 
emotional implications of the theme for the external audience are drawn 
out by means of the focalization of internal audiences—as Achilles pities 
Priam, so the Romans shudder at the misfortune that strikes Aemilius at 
the height of his success (35. 3).27 And, again as in the Iliad, the theme is 
used to articulate the vulnerability that unites all human beings, friend 
and foe, winner and loser: as the Romans shudder at the fate of Aemilius, 
so “everyone” shudders at the outcome of the war, that the wealth of an 
entire nation should amount to so little once divided in the hands of its 
conquerors (29. 5); and the counterpart of Aemilius’ success is the downfall 
of Perseus, a reminder of that vulnerability that is realized in the personal 
tragedy that strikes at the height of Aemilius’ success.
Already, in this respect, the Life of Aemilius exhibits a pronounced 
comparative aspect: the careers of Aemilius and Perseus engage the 
capacities of comparison and contrast that underlie the entire project of 
parallel biography.28 Accordingly, to get the most out of this pair of Lives, 
and their meditations on the mutability of fortune, we need to read each 
in the light of the other. Tychē is not only the Leitmotiv of the Aemilius but 
also the theme that unites Aemilius-Timoleon as a pair.29 In that respect, the 
two biographies present similar careers with different emphases, but what 
is explicit and salient in the one is often implicit in the other.30 First, the 
motif of tychē not only links but also distinguishes the two Lives as sections 
of a single book, as the first Life’s movement to a climax in which good 
fortune is immediately mixed with bad is followed by the second’s progress 
27 Cf. Pelling 2005a, 282–83.
28 For the comparison of Aemilius and Perseus as a reflection of Plut.’s project, see 
Tatum 2010b, 7–8. 
29 Cf. note 7 above.
30 For general points on the interrelations between the Lives in each pair and the need to 
read each via the other, see Erbse (1956) 1979; Stadter 1975; Pelling 1986; 2002; 2005b; 
Desideri 1992; Duff 1999; cf. the contributions to Humble 2010, esp. Tatum 2010b, 
1–8; cf. Tatum 2010a, 452. Specifically on Aem.-Tim., see Geiger 1981, 99–104; Desideri 
1989; Swain 1989c, esp. 314; Tatum 2010a.
  Cairns | Roman Imperium, Greek Paideia    17
from early misfortune (Timoleon’s part in the killing of his brother, 4. 4–7. 
1) to prodigious success.31 The Aemilius, moreover, unfolds in a simple 
diachronic sequence in which, as we saw, the triumph and the events that 
surround it form a clear climax; the structure of Timoleon, by contrast, is 
more complex, beginning with a reference to its main event (Timoleon’s 
expedition to Sicily, 1. 1) before going back in time, relating first the state 
of the island at that point (1. 2–2. 4) and then Timoleon’s early career as a 
soldier (3. 5–7.2), culminating in his part in his brother’s murder (4. 5–8), a 
part he played only when all alternatives failed and because his patriotism, 
sense of honor and justice, and hatred of tyrants and villains (3. 5, 5. 1) 
proved stronger than familial solidarity. The opprobrium that this brought 
him, together with his mother’s anger, then drives Timoleon from public 
life, for a period of almost twenty years (5. 2–4, 7. 1);32 it is at the end of 
that period that he is chosen general for the expedition to Sicily (7. 2), an 
enterprise that then occupies the Life in chronological sequence until Sicily 
is free of tyrants and the Carthaginians banished to their own part of the 
island (to 34. 7). The honor and popularity that Timoleon thereafter enjoys 
and the honors he receives on death then bring the biography to a close 
(chapters 35–39). Thus the sequence of the main narrative (success and 
its rewards) demonstrates the function of the inset, early years narrative 
(misfortune and opprobrium) as a contrasting mise en abyme. 
Within these differences of structure, however, the two narratives 
exhibit many similarities of theme. In both, the mutability of fortune 
is a factor that affects all, winners and losers, hero and foil, virtuous 
and vicious: not only Aemilius and Timoleon but also their negative 
counterparts (Perseus in the former case, Hicetas and especially Dionysius 
in the latter) serve as paradigms of vicissitude.33 The failure of these 
31 For Geiger, it is this sequence that explains why Aem. comes first (1981, 104); Swain 
1989c, 314, rightly suspects that the importance of the theme runs more deeply than 
that. 
32 Aemilius also has his “wilderness years”: Aem. 6. 8–10, 10. 1.
33 For Perseus in Aem., see above. In Tim., the hero’s eutychia and aretē are clearly 
mirrored in the contrasting presentation of his opponents, and Hicetas is a central aspect 
of this antithesis; but it is the career of Dionysius that is in particular singled out for 
moralizing on the mutability of fortune—his surrender represents “unexpected eutychia” 
for Timoleon (13. 3), but also occasions reflections on the extremes of vicissitude to 
which a single human life can be subject (13. 8–10), his fall from tyrant to wastrel a 
“work of tychē” (14. 3) that evokes mockery and rejoicing among those who see him 
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negative paradigms to respond to their circumstances with dignity thus 
highlights the aretē that characterizes both Aemilius and Timoleon in their 
attitudes to vicissitude.34 This is a theme that is signaled in the prologue to 
both Lives (whether their success was due to luck or judgment, eupotmia or 
phronēsis, Aem. 1. 6, quoted above) and one to which Plutarch returns in 
the synkrisis (2. 10–12),35 where Aemilius’ strength of character in dealing 
with the loss of his sons (Aem. 26. 1–27. 1) is contrasted favorably with 
Timoleon’s utter dejection following the killing of his brother (Tim. 5. 2–4, 
7. 1, with moralizing commentary in 6. 1–7).36 But though the interaction 
of aretē and tychē is indeed a theme of both Lives, highlighted especially 
in the “bravery and confidence,” the “great and noble expression of a 
sincere and honest character” with which Aemilius is said to face up to 
tychē at 36. 1 and 37. 1,37 the expression of the antithesis as such is perhaps 
more explicit and salient in Timoleon.38 In the end, however, Aemilius 
and Timoleon are alike; the way that they themselves emphasize the role 
of tychē in their success illustrates the aretē of which the narrative gives 
ample testimony (Aem. 27. 2–6, Tim. 36. 5–6).39
“overthrown by tychē,” but sympathy in those for whom his metabolē represents the 
vulnerability of all human beings to “the power of invisible, divine causation” (14. 2). 
For Dionysius’ dystychia as the explicit complement of Timoleon’s eutychia, see 16. 1.
34 Perseus: see esp. 26. 8–12, 34. 1–4 (discussed above); Dionysius, see Tim. 15, esp. 
Dionysius’ remark at 15. 4: “Don’t you think that the way I bear my change of tychē 
shows how I profited from association with Plato?”
35 On the Plutarchan prologue as an introduction to both Lives in a pair, see Duff 2011. 
36 On the aretē-tychē antithesis in Plut., see Swain 1989d on De fort. Rom.; cf. Lamberton 
2001, 98–99.
37 Cf. the combination of aretē and eutychia in the history of Aemilius’ family at Aem. 2. 
3; the references to or illustrations of Aemilius’ aretai at 2. 6, 4. 3–5, 5. 8, 10. 1, 13. 6, 
18. 1, 28. 1–11, 30. 1, 31. 4, 39. 9; and (esp.) the proleptic verdict on the respective roles 
of tychē and divine favor versus virtue in the victory over Perseus at 12. 1–3. On the 
presence of the theme in both Lives, see Desideri 1989, 204–13; Swain 1989c, 324, 330–
31. On his response to misfortune as a mark of Aemilius’ aretē, cf. Desideri 1989, 208–9; 
Swain 1989b, 275; on tychē as a test of character in general, cf. Swain 1989a, 64–65, 
67–68. For the same theme in Polybius and for the relevance of the Polybian belief in 
Aem., cf. Tatum 2010a, 454–58, 460. The theme emerges programmatically at Plb. 1. 1. 
2, and is restated with reference to Aemilius himself at 29. 20 (Tatum 2010a, 454–55; cf. 
Hau 2007, 141); cf., for example, 18. 33. 4–8, on Philip V.
38 Explicitly at 19. 1, 21. 4–5, 36. 4–5, 37. 5; implicit in 6. 1–7.2, 15. 1–4 (Dionysius), 26. 
3, 38. 1; cf. Swain 1989c, 330–31. 
39 As Tatum remarks, Timoleon’s words at 36. 5–6 represent “a gesture Plutarch 
elsewhere records as an elegant example of self-praise (de laud. ipsius 542E)” (2010a, 
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The way that a theme can be salient and explicit in one of the pair, 
less salient but still significant in the other, is further illustrated by 
the presentation of our central topic, the mutability of fortune and the 
impossibility of unmixed eudaimonia. In the Aemilius, disaster strikes at the 
height of Aemilius’ success, whereas Timoleon puts his early misfortunes 
behind him and ends his days secure in the honor and esteem in which he 
is held by the recipients of his benefactions.40 But Timoleon’s felicity is not 
entirely unmixed: by remaining in Sicily rather than returning to Corinth, 
he avoids the malicious resentment of one’s fellow citizens (πολιτικὸς 
φθόνος) that typically attends the successful (and ambitious) general (36. 
8), though not even he can escape phthonos entirely. Attacked by Syracusan 
demagogues, he uses their very freedom to attack him as a token of the 
benefactions that are properly appreciated by the vast majority of their 
fellows (37. 1–3). Even then, however, Timoleon’s retirement is not 
entirely free of setbacks: he gradually loses his sight, eventually becoming 
completely blind (37. 7–10). Though Plutarch is at pains to emphasize 
that this is an affliction that runs in his family rather than an arbitrary 
“insult” on the part of Tyche (οὔτε παροινηθεὶς ὑπὸ τῆς Τύχης, 37. 7), it 
is nonetheless a misfortune, a symphora (that brings out both his own 
strength of character and the esteem in which he is held by the Syracusans, 
38. 1–3). In this way—in a minor key and in the midst of a much more 
pronounced emphasis on Timoleon’s felicity—the pattern that we see first 
in the phthonos that threatens Aemilius’ triumph (Aem. 30. 4–32. 1), then 
in the misfortune that strikes at the height of his success (demonstrating 
the truth of the gnōmē, supported by the Iliadic parable of the jars, that 
“no one’s life is entirely free of misfortune,” Aem. 34. 8), and finally in the 
fortitude and wisdom with which Aemilius bears his misfortune (Aem. 36. 
1–37. 1) is replicated in the case of Timoleon. The principle of alternation, 
though explicitly enunciated and explicitly related to its emblematic 
statement in the Iliad only in the Aemilius, recurs as an organizing principle, 
an ethical norm, and a template that structures audience response also in 
the Timoleon. 41
452).
40 Tim. 36. 1–39. 7, the length of this section in itself attesting to the emphasis on 
Timoleon’s eudaimonia; the equivalent section in Aem. is two chapters to Tim.’s four.
41 Cf. Pelling 1986, 94 (= Pelling 2002, 357).
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Both Lives thus manifest the whole-life perspective that is characteristic 
of traditional Greek thought on the nature of eudaimonia. In both, the 
vicissitudes of fortune play a substantial role in the subject’s career. 
And in both, the subject’s overall felicity, emphasized particularly in the 
concluding sections with reference to the esteem in which he is held by 
peers and posterity, is attained not just by an alliance of eutychia and 
aretē, but by the kind of aretē that proves itself when tychē is most testing. 
Both Lives emphasize personal qualities, personal vicissitudes. Undeniably, 
however, the Timoleon (as Simon Swain has pointed out) places much 
greater and more explicit emphasis on the interplay of individual tychē and 
divine providence. Throughout, Timoleon’s affairs are apparently guided 
by an unseen supernatural force whose aims coincide with his own—
the freedom of the Greeks in Sicily from tyrannical rule and barbarian 
domination.42 
On the apparent contrast between the two Lives in this respect, Swain 
observes: 
Plutarch might have developed these ideas about providence in Aem. too. 
He chose not to. He doubtless felt that the events in which Aemilius was 
involved were not after all stupendous and were for the most part explicable 
in human terms alone.43
A priori, this explanation seems unlikely. But it is not just that, as Swain 
himself emphasizes, Plutarch elsewhere shows himself to be a believer 
in the providential rise of Rome (and in the political and military decline 
of Greece that is its counterpart).44 Nor is it merely that Plutarch also 
identifies Aemilius Paullus as a figure whose own good fortune contributed 
42 See Tim. 3. 1–3, 13. 4, 8. 1–8, 12. 3, 12. 9, 13. 1, 14. 2–3, 16. 1, 16. 10–12, 19. 1, 20. 1, 
20. 11, 21. 5, 21. 7, 26. 1–6, 27. 9, 28. 2, 30. 3, 30. 6–7, 30. 10, 36. 2, 36. 5, 37. 5, 37. 7. 
For this as a project of providence, cf. Dion 4. 3–4, 50. 4, with Swain 1989c, 329.
43 Swain 1989c, 334; cf. “Aemilius’ campaign did not produce really great changes in the 
world” (1989b, 275).
44 On the rise of Rome, see Fab. 27. 2, De fort. Rom. 317F–318A (Rome as Tyche’s final 
destination), 342B–D, with Swain 1989b, 286–98; 1989c, 327 n. 48; 1989d; cf. Tatum 
2010a, 450 n. 4; for Greece’s destined decline, see Dem. 19. 1, Phoc. 28. 2–3, Phil. 17. 2, 
Flam. 12. 10 (with Swain 1989b, 281–85, 293). In the last two passages cited, the point 
is that Rome’s rise is Greece’s fall. 
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to that rise.45 It is not even that, as Tatum persuasively argues, Plutarch’s 
emphasis on the role of tychē in Aemilius’ career strongly suggests 
engagement with Polybius, whose presentation of Aemilius exemplifies his 
programmatic views on the moral purpose of historiography and for whom 
Aemilius’ defeat of the last king of Macedonia is the event that decisively 
confirms the decline of Greece’s fortunes and the rise of Rome’s.46 All of 
these things are relevant; but the crucial point is that the providential 
interpretation of Aemilius’ part in the rise of Rome is not in fact absent 
from the pairing of Aemilius and Timoleon. 
First, the synkrisis presents the achievements of both in parallel terms: 
while Timoleon “removed all the tyrannies from Sicily and freed the 
island,” Aemilius “took Macedonia and ended the line of succession that 
began with Antigonus in the reign of its seventh king” (Comp. 1. 2; cf. 2. 
8). The end of the Macedonian dynasty is by no means a negligible stage 
in the rise of Rome: this is emphasized by Aemilius’ observation that the 
fall of “the succession of Alexander” suggests the instability of all success,47 
a point that recalls Polybius’ assessment at 29. 21, where the defeat of 
Perseus prompts the historian’s reminiscence of the similar conclusions 
drawn by Demetrius of Phalerum about Alexander’s conquest of Persia and 
the rise and fall of great powers. Nor is the fall of Macedon, in Aemilius, 
an achievement that is won without supernatural guidance: if the omens 
and the like recounted in the Timoleon (three in chapter 8 alone, at the 
beginning of his enterprise, others in 12. 9, 26, 31. 6–7) indicate the plans 
of providence, the Aemilius also has its fair share; the explicit point of those 
that are related in Aem. 24. 2–6 is to demonstrate that there was something 
45 See De fort. Rom. 4, 318B–C, where Aemilius is an example of the Roman leaders 
whose tychē (which must encompass his success against Perseus) has contributed to that 
of Rome in general; cf. Swain 1989d, 508–9.
46 See Tatum 2010a, 454–56 on Plb. 1. 4. 1, 1. 4. 4–5, with 29. 20, where Aemilius 
himself “reprises Polybius’ own views on the purpose of history” (Tatum 2010a, 455); 
cf. Plb. 29. 21. 1–9—it is significant that Plb. located this digression on Demetrius of 
Phalerum’s views on tychē at this point (Tatum 2010a, 456). On Plb. 1. 4. 1, 4–5, cf. 
Hau 2011, 187–89, 196. Hau 2011 in general makes substantial progress over earlier 
scholarship in seeing the underlying schema to which all senses of tychē in Plb. might be 
related. 
47 This is a point that is kept before us by the references to Alexander and the 
Macedonian dynasty to which Perseus belongs at 8. 1ff., 12. 9–11, 23. 9, and esp. 31. 5 
(Aemilius’ triumph entails the display of “the king of Macedon taken alive and the glory 
of Alexander and Philip led as booty under Roman arms”).
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supernatural (daimonion, 24. 3) or divine (θειότητι ... καὶ τύχῃ, 24. 4) about 
Aemilius’ eutychia. The notion of divine favor, as we saw above, punctuates 
the narrative.48 Similarly, Swain is surely wrong that, unlike Livy at 45. 41. 
2, “Plutarch does not choose to contrast Rome’s permanent public fortune 
with Aemilius’ private disaster,” but rather (in his speech to the populace 
following the death of his sons) “has Aemilius contrast his own public 
fortune in the campaign with his personal misfortune at home”:49 in fact, 
Aemilius is quite explicit both about his relief that tragedy has marred only 
his own personal fortunes rather than “the future of the state” (36. 7) and 
about his confidence that tychē will remain constant in favoring Rome and 
her people (“you,” 36. 8).
These, to be sure, are slight indications, but it is much more likely 
that they are to be understood in the light not only of widely shared 
assumptions about Rome’s destiny, but also of the explicit reflections 
of the providential guidance of the world in Timoleon; the second Life 
offers a way of reading the first that makes explicit and salient what 
would otherwise remain in the background.50 The two narratives, as 
a pair, concern the mutability of fortune as it affects states as well as 
individuals (a historiographical topos that goes back all the way to the 
very beginning of Herodotus’ Histories).51 Though Plutarch’s appreciation 
of Timoleon’s providential mission in ridding Sicily of tyrants and keeping 
the Carthaginians at bay is no doubt genuine,52 the fact that his narrative 
48 See the references cited in notes 13–14 above, and cf. Tatum 2010a, 453. I see no basis 
for Swain’s assertion that “there is nothing comparable in Aem.” to the omens of Tim. 8, 
12, and 26 (1989c, 332).
49 Swain 1989c, 326–27.
50 So “in Plutarch, the providential forces that so conspicuously propel Timoleon’s 
liberation of the Greeks of Sicily recall, for the reader of this pairing, the world historical 
impulse that brought Rome to greatness by way of the career of Aemilius Paullus. 
The freedom of the Greeks and the rise of Rome are results borne [sic] of the same 
providence” (Tatum 2010a, 460).
51 See Hdt. 1. 5. 3–4, with Krause 1976, 221–22; Harrison 2000, 31–33, 62–63; Raaflaub 
2002, 177; Van Wees 2002, 328–36; Hau 2007, 84.
52 Swain 1989c, 329, 333–34; cf. Swain 1989b, 283–84. For Tatum, Plutarch’s emphasis 
on this point constitutes a correction of Polybius’ attack on Timaeus (Plb. 12. 23. 4–6) 
for magnifying events that were of only limited significance compared to the rise of 
Rome (2010a, 459–60). On Timoleon as the only great figure of his generation who 
succeeded in the Isocratean project of making war only on barbarians and tyrants, rather 
than on other Greek states, see Tim. 37. 4.
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of these events is preceded by that of a crucial stage in Rome’s providential 
rise implies the temporal limitations of Timoleon’s achievement;53 the 
destiny of free Greek states, in Sicily and elsewhere, makes way for that 
of Rome. Yet Timoleon’s achievements had their legitimate place in the 
providential scheme of things. The Lives of Aemilius and Timoleon, taken 
together as a single book, are saying something about the place of Greek 
and Roman civilization in world history.
If it is the Timoleon that emphasizes the broader questions of the 
rise and fall of states and cultures, it is the Aemilius that establishes, for 
this pair of Lives, the relevance of the classic model of the principle of 
alternation. As we see not least from their presence in Livy, these ideas 
were in Plutarch’s day common coin of Roman as well as Greek thought.54 
But Plutarch reemphasizes their Greekness. He does so partly in his 
presentation of Aemilius as an untypically philosophical Roman, allegedly 
descended from Pythagoras, the nomen of his gens etymologized in Greek 
(2. 2), who practiced virtue, not forensic oratory (2. 6), and who sees the 
value of Greek education (6. 8–9), so that his sons became devoted to 
literature (28. 11).55 But above all Plutarch re-Hellenizes the theme of the 
mutability of fortune by situating it firmly in the Greek poetic tradition.56 
Though the Timoleon also underscores its emphasis on the theme of tychē 
53 As Swain notes, Timoleon’s successes “were of limited duration (as Plutarch must have 
known)” (1989b, 292–93).
54 For the appeal of classic Greek formulations of the principle of alternation at Rome, 
cf. Cic. Tusc. 3. 24. 59–25. 60, quoting E. Hyps. 921–27 (in translation). At a very general 
level, we may even be dealing with a narrative universal, in so far as “the narrative 
mode . . . deals in human or human-like intention and action and the vicissitudes and 
consequences that mark their course” (Bruner 1986, 13; cf. Bruner 1986, 16–18, 88; 
Oatley 2012, 23, 45, 191). 
55 Cf. 3. 3: Aemilius’ augurship is not just a step on the cursus honorum, but manifests 
a genuine, quasi-philosophical religiosity. As Swain notes, Aemilius’ “unusual and 
Hellenic sounding education (2. 6), which Plutarch has probably fabricated, prefigures 
his philhellenism (28) and moral courage (36)” (1989c, 316); cf. Swain 1990, 132–33. 
Tatum (2013) sees Plutarch’s project of emphasizing Aemilius’ quasi-Hellenic virtues 
also in the account of Aemilius’ decision to dig wells in the vicinity of Mount Olympus 
at Aem. 14.
56 Cf., for example, Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ presentation (via extensive evocation 
of the speech of Phoenix and the allegory of the Litai, Il. 9. 496–514) of Coriolanus as 
a second Achilles at Ant. Rom. 8. 50. 3–4 (with Davies 2005). Várhelyi 2012, 124–28 
usefully situates this presentation in the context of the development of synkrisis as 
practiced by Plutarch.
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by the deployment of literary quotation,57 it is the relation of the Aemilius 
to Iliad 24 (by means of two quotations and one clear allusion) that really 
sets the tone, for that Life and for the pair. In making the life of Aemilius, 
in particular, conform to a pattern established in a salient passage of Greek 
civilization’s most exemplary artistic production, and by making Aemilius 
himself—the man who finally ended the Macedonian monarchy and thus 
completed a crucial step in Rome’s rise to hegemony—a prototype of 
Roman philhellenism, Plutarch underlines the claims of a Greek literary 
and intellectual culture that survives Greece’s political and military 
subordination to Rome.58
Central to Plutarch’s narrative in Aemilius is the Iliadic idea that good 
fortune is a fragile thing, because suffering is intrinsic to the human 
condition, whether one is good or bad, careful or reckless, great or 
insignificant. These are traditional ideas about the nature of happiness that 
bring with them traditional ways of feeling, traditional ways of responding 
to the texts that embody these ways of feeling, and texts that exemplify 
traditional values by associating them with exemplary narratives of the 
lives of exemplary figures. The Greekness of the Life of Aemilius Paullus 
(and thus of the pair of Lives to which it belongs) lies not only in the way 
that its narrative structure, its exemplary moral purpose, and its intellectual 
and emotional content are all inextricably linked, but also in the way that, 
like other texts that engage with the same ideas, it returns explicitly to 
the source of these narrative and cultural models in the most seminal and 
authoritative works of Greek literature.59 
The principle of alternation is not unique as traditional wisdom or as 
narrative theme,60 nor is the tradition that recurs to that principle uniquely 
Greek in intellectual, affective, or aesthetic terms. Yet the principle has, for 
the Greeks themselves, a special place in Greek culture. It is a normative 
pattern to which Greek artists and audiences repeatedly turn as a means 
of making sense of and giving form to experience. This they do in forms 
57 Sophocles at 1. 3; Euripides, as quoted by Euthymus at 32. 3; Timaeus’ quotation of 
Sophocles at 36. 2.
58 For Rome’s philhellenism as a factor in her providential rise to dominance, see Flam. 
12. 1–10, with Swain 1989b, 293. 
59 On the importance in Plutarch’s biographical project of the characteristic norms and 
paradigms of traditional Greek thought, cf. Desideri 1992, 4481–86.
60 See Cairns 2014 for parallels in other (related and unrelated) traditions.
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as minimal as a single aphorism and as extensive as the Iliad, but at either 
end of the spectrum the principle of alternation is a pattern that cries out 
for exemplification in narratives of the doings and sufferings of specific 
individuals. As a universal phenomenon in the lives of individuals it also 
readily becomes, from the very beginnings of Greek historiography, a 
world-historical pattern in the rise and fall of great powers. The tendency 
to encapsulate the pattern of vicissitude, with its attendant normative and 
emotional associations, in traditional narratives of an exemplary character 
is a salient and typical feature of the Greek literary tradition, found in some 
of its most authoritative and influential manifestations. The recurrence 
of this pattern in Plutarch’s Parallel Lives of Aemilius Paullus and Timoleon 
underlines what Plutarch clearly sees as the abiding value of Greek popular 
ethics, literary culture, and civilization during a period long after the Greek 
states had succumbed to Roman military and political hegemony.
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